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This paper focuses on the illegal production， such as poaching， and the effect of some institutional 
and policy instruments on the production. Especially， we focus on the roles and the effects of trade 
ban. 
The paper provides a simple general equilibrium model in which both legal and illegal 
markets exist interdependently， by introducing the concept of“moral pain" that is crucial to 
differentiate between the prices in the legal and the illegal markets. Using the model， we investigate， 
first of al， the effects of raising the confiscation e百ortin the black market and the laundering on 
the illegal production， and also the effect of controlling the legal supply on it. In addition， we 
examine the effects on the profit of illegal producer and the launderer. 
Based on these results， trade ban is evaluated; the ban does not minimize the illegal 
production， and it can maximize it under a condition when laundering is not present. However， 
when the laundering is possible， a small enough legal supply will be shown to be harm白1than the 
situation under the trade ban. But if the legal supply is large enough， tolift the ban and supply the 
legal goods will reduce the illegal production. Finally， we show that the legal supply is a useful 
policy instrument in the sense that it can generate a policy mix by which the e百ortto extinguish the 
laundering will always result in reducing the illegal production and the profits from black business. 
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